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Abstract
Some digital business models may be so innovative that they overw helm existing
regulatory mechanisms, both legislation and historical jurisprudence, and require
extension to or modification of antitrust law . Regulatory policies that w ere developed
th
th
in response to 19 or 20 century antitrust concerns dealt principally w ith economies of
scale leading to monopoly pow er, and may not be w ell suited to the issues of netw ork
effects or third-party payer online business models like sponsored search. From the
perspective of information systems economics w e investigate if such third party payer
digital systems require intervention as profound as the Government’s innovative
approach to the problems posed by A T& T in the 1913 Kingsbury Commitment,
establishing the first private regulated monopoly. Google provides an example of a
company w hose innovative digital business model is difficult to fit into current
regulatory framew orks, and may provide examples of the issues that might require an
extension to regulatory policy.
Keyw ords: Digital Business Strategies, Search, Sponsored Search, Keyw ord A uctions,
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I ntroduction
Objectives of the Paper
This paper addresses the regulatory prospects facing any truly successful firm in an age
of Internet technology, “ winner take all” economics [43], and integrated platform-based
competition. The major issue addressed in the paper how w ell suited A merican legal
practice, especially commercial and antitrust statutes and jurisprudence, are for dealing
w ith modern digital business strategies.
A merican commercial and regulatory legal practice w as largely formulated during an
industrial era, w hen the dangers of monopoly market pow er w ere associated w ith
manufacturing giants. Of course, the courts have creatively constructed the present
antitrust doctrine to keep it as relevant as possible, and much of w hat is applied to cases
today is the result of the courts’ interpretations of the Sherman A ct rather than the
Sherman A ct itself. Still, the courts are alw ays to some extent constrained by the
original legislation that defines the issues before them and by the history of
jurisprudence, w hich itself often lags behind industrial practices. M anufacturers note
that the courts are much better at regulating them than they are at regulating giant
retailers like Wal-M art and H ome Depot; of course, at the time that the Sherman A ct
w as drafted, antitrust w as far more concerned w ith the very real prospect of giant
manufacturing trusts than it w as w ith the then-unimaginable problems caused by giant
retailers.
This leads us to ask how appropriate existing regulatory framew orks are to competition
among businesses w ith modern, post-industrial digital business models. Inevitably,
attempting to apply existing law to these businesses w ill need to deal w ith issues never
anticipated either w hen legislation w as drafted or w hen it w as interpreted over decades
of jurisprudence. Inevitably, there w ill be disputes, and this paper addresses w here
they w ill arise. We also ask w hen commercial and regulatory legal practice might
actually fail to address the new competitive environment and thus need to be explicitly
altered and updated. We believe that extensions to antitrust w ill be required, that to
some extent extensions can be addressed through additional flexibility and
reinterpretation by the courts, and that to some extent legislative change w ill be
required. We use the perspective of information economics to address limitations, and
to guide extensions. We believe that technology determines w hat it is possible for firms
to do, and the interaction of economics and technology guides the behavior of profit
maximizing firms. When the behavior of these firms is not consistent w ith public policy
objectives, technology, economics, and profit maximizing behavior are largely outside
society’s control, but the law s and regulations that guide the firms are not.
We believe that the implications of current technology are so far outside of w hat w as
anticipated w hen most of our regulatory framew orks w ere constructed that these
framew orks may fail to provide socially desirable outcomes w hen firms rationally
adopt new ly available business models. A lthough w e are w riting for an information
systems readership, w e have felt it necessary to provide a significant number of legal
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citations. First, these citations take the debate out of the domain of mere opinion, and
provide the basis for our analyses. Second, and more importantly, if our information
systems colleagues are to extend our w ork, they should not need to reproduce our legal
research, but rather can begin their ow n analyses w ith a firm understanding of the legal
jurisprudence upon w hich the current legal debates are going to be based.
To illustrate this last point, the need to clarify, extend, or modify current legal practice,
w e take an example from Google’s history, w here the courts have been attempting to
rule on a current business practice that w as not anticipated w hen relevant legislation
w as drafted, and w here the courts have specifically requested that Congress provide
more explicit guidance. We use this example merely to illustrate the need for additional
regulatory clarity; w e w ill not stress this example in the body of this paper. The intent
of the Lanham A ct (also know n informally as the Trademark A ct) w as clear: (1) to
prevent consumer confusion by restricting the use of brands and trademarks to their
legitimate ow ners and (2) to increase the quality of products offered to consumers by
providing incentives for companies to invest in their brands. The Trademark A ct is
very specific about the protections it affords a brand, providing that no company can
use another company’s trademark for commercial purposes in a w ay that confuses or
misguides consumers; the exact w ording, about using a competitor’s trademark for
commercial gain, is less clear today than w as believed w hen the A ct w as originally
i
drafted. In other w ords, it’s clear from the statute that a company cannot put a Coke
label on a can of Pepsi or even on a machine that sells Pepsi and not Coke.
Unfortunately, w ith today’s online business models, w ith sale of trademarks and
optimization of search engine relative positioning, there are many opportunities to use
trademarks in w ays that w ere not anticipated and thus now much about the bill that is
no longer clear.
H ow does this act inform us in assessing w hether or not a search engine operator’s sale
of keyw ords is or should be legitimate? By selling trademarks it does not ow n in a
keyw ord auction search engines are certainly using the trademarks of other companies
for their ow n commercial gain, although in a w ay not anticipated by the framers of the
Trademark A ct. A s certainly, by selling a company’s trademark to a competitor for use
in the competitor’s marketing efforts, may in some sense be the equivalent of putting
Coke logo’s on a Pepsi machine that it operates, but again it w as acting in a w ay that
w as not anticipated by the drafters of the Trademark A ct. This may be like misdirecting
Coke’s customers to a Pepsi machine, but in general properly labeling the machine
w hen the customers actually arrive. A t present it is unclear if this is the legal equivalent
of mislabeling the vending machine, or indeed if it should be.
So does sale of registered trademarks as search terms violate the Trademark A ct? The
courts initially decided it did not in the Rescuecom case [87], but in Google’s first major
legal setback this w as reversed by the Second Circuit Court of A ppeals. The Court
claimed that this practice could not have been endorsed by the framers of the A ct; as
importantly, they requested more clear and more modern and relevant guidance from
Congress. Google has lost trademark cases in Europe [59] and, more recently, has w on
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cases as w ell [72]. The issue is further complicated by the fact that Rescuecom has
subsequently dropped its suit against Google [52], so resolution of ambiguity w ill not
come from the Rescuecom case.
When w e need a specific instance w e focus on Google in this study, largely for the same
reasons that the authors of previous cases focused on Capital One in the case study of
screening mechanisms in banking as a test of the new ly vulnerable markets hypothesis
[32], on M cKesson Drug in the case study of the strategic necessity hypothesis in drug
distribution [31], or the case study of the London Stock Exchange after its automation
made it the first major securities market to abandon its trading floor [33]. These w ere
important early exemplars of emerging trends, trends w ith lessons beyond the
individual company studied, and indeed beyond the industry in which these exemplars
competed. Google is the search engine w ith the largest market share, has been involved
in more litigation, and is facing more discussion of regulation. It is, indeed, the best
example w e could find for assessing the future of A merican regulation of digital
businesses.
Google has announced its intention to defend itself against any and all litigation. In
fact, Google’s 10-K filing for 2008 indicates that their general and administrative
expenses increased from $1.279.3 billion in 2007 to $1.802.6 billion in 2008. A s they note,
“ This increase w as primarily related to an increase in professional services of $243.0
million, the majority of w hich w ere related to legal costs ...” [46]. For instance, rather
than concede on the sensitive issue of trademark abuse, Google has announced that it
intends to extend its policy (as described on its w ebsite) on allow ing companies to bid
for the right to use other companies’ trademarks in its A dSense and A dWords auctions
[92]. It is clear that Google is prepared to challenge ambiguities and anachronisms in
commercial jurisprudence, making this an ideal w ay to approach an understanding of
the strengths and possible limitations of current regulatory practice. It is equally clear
that regulators and legislators need to respond w ith a clear understanding of the
economics of digital businesses and the risks and benefits to consumers implicit in new
digital strategies.
Specific I ssues Addressed in Our Research
We address the follow ing five areas, informed by legal doctrine, but from the
perspective of information economics:
1. Presence of M onopoly: When is a new digital business model an extension to
previous products or services competing w ith them for share of an existing
market, and w hen is it radical enough to represent a business in its ow n right,
and not a substitute for other companies’ historical offerings?
2. Presence of M onopoly Power: When do you know that you have monopoly
pow er and a monopoly ability to set prices?
3. Abuse of M onopoly Power: H ow can you tell w hen monopoly pow er has been
abused, causing harm to consumers, competitors, or to the very process of
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competition?
4. Applicability and Efficacy of Existing Legal Remedies: When can monopoly
pow er be limited through the legal system? Traditionally, monopoly pow er has
been prosecuted only w hen it is obtained illegally, in order to rew ard
entrepreneurial creativity; monopoly pow er obtained through innovation and
excellence has generally been held to be legal. In rare instances, monopoly
pow er w as considered to be a fundamental property of an industry, as it w as
w ith 19th and 20th century telephony, prior to easy interconnectivity among
competing service providers; in that case the concept of a regulated natural
monopoly w as introduced.
5. N eed for Fundamental Regulatory Change: Do third party payer digital
business models, as exemplified by paid search, require intervention as profound
as the Justice Department’s intervention against A T& T in The Kingsbury
Commitment? We believe that each of these questions is best addressed from the
perspective of information economics, and indeed, information economics w ill
be necessary to guide and inform the development of appropriate law .
Throughout this paper w e w ill use the term economics to mean micro-economics and
the analysis of the decisions of consumers w ho are maximizing their w elfare and firms
that are maximizing their profits. Consumers decide how much to w ork and at w hat
jobs, and w hat to purchase and how much to purchase of the goods and services on
offer. Firms decide w hat to produce, how to produce it, and w hat quantities to offer,
based on their assessment of the decisions of consumers and of other firms.
Overview of Principal Areas of Legal D octrine Used in Our Analyses
The principal legal issues w e use to support our information economic analyses are
listed below . This short introduction is not intended to detail the logic or to present
either current statutes or jurisprudence and litigation history. It is intended to guide the
reader through w hat w ill follow and to allow the reader w ho is less familiar w ith
antitrust or w ith legal reasoning to impose some structure on the paper as he or she
reads through the text:
•

Relevant M arket Share — H ow w ould you know if you w ere dealing w ith a
monopoly? You start by determining w hat the relevant market is, and then
examine the company’s share of that market.
For example, is Google just
another advertising company or is it the dominant player in search? Similarly,
the Department of Justice (DoJ) needed to determine if M icrosoft w as just
another softw are firm or if it w as the dominant player in operating systems for
Intel-based personal computers? This is essential to determining if a company
has monopoly pow er.

•

Electronic D istribution and the Essential Facilities D octrine — Is search a form
of advertising, or is it better view ed as a form of electronic distribution, w ith its
ow n economics and business model, quite separate from advertising? Is search

Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith N atural
M onopolies or Third Party Payment Business M odels

Draft 8.11 / / 29 June 2010
page 7

an essential facility, one that indeed not only can augment advertising but in a
real sense can trump it by redirect customers aw ay from one w ell-advertised
brand and to competitors? Does control over search confer enormous and
perhaps irresistible market pow er and pricing pow er in the sale of keyw ords?
Does this pow er even survive the presence of viable competitors, allow ing the
formation of “ parallel monopolies” , each w ith monopoly pricing pow er? Does the
seller of an essential facility have monopoly pow er even if the price is set
through a market auction? A lternatively, perhaps none of these questions is
relevant. Does essential facilities doctrine even apply, since historically it has
been used to regulate transactions betw een competitors: The doctrine may have
been applicable in disputes betw een M CI and A T& T or betw een airlines and the
reservations systems ow ned by competing airlines, but is it applicable in
disputes betw een Google and its bidders, w hich are firms in very different
industries? This is essential to determining if a company has monopoly pow er
even in the absence of monopoly market share. It is also relevant to determining
if a company has been behaving as a monopolist.
•

Bundling, Subsidies, and the Potential Stifling of Competition — Is the giving
aw ay of products, bundled (as Internet Explorer w as w ith Window s) or standalone (as gM ail is w ith search) necessarily a form of predatory pricing, does it
stifle competition, and is it alw ays associated w ith a potentially predatory
monopoly? While giving products aw ay w ithout charge is not illegal, giving
products aw ay to develop a monopoly position to be exploited later is indeed
illegal. When foreign firms engage in this practice w ithin the United States it is
called dumping and it is indeed prosecuted. While the tight interaction of
products and services is beneficial to consumers, bundling, tying, and crosssubsidies may harm future competition, even if no present competitor and no
present consumer can demonstrate harm. A ntitrust law does indeed permit
prosecution of actions that harm the competitive process, even if no consumers
ii
and no firms have yet been directly harmed. This is useful w hen determining if
a company has been behaving as a monopolist or is positioning itself to behave
as a monopolist in the future, or both.

•

Separation of Payer and User in a Platform that Constitutes an Essential
Facility — Third party payer business models did not originate w ith the Internet,
but they may so thoroughly decouple pricing from the discipline of the market,
and they may now become so prevalent among Internet firms, as to require a
change in regulatory philosophy. Google’s business model is only the latest
example of a third party payer platform; earlier examples included Sabre and
A pollo as computerized travel agent reservation systems. In the third-party
payer model, the provider of the platform (party one) provides an essential
service to the user community (party tw o) w ithout charge, w hile charging a third
party for participation (party three), in this instance charging searchers nothing
to search w hile charging the third party fees in order to be present and thus in
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order to be found. A re the economics and channel pow er implications of this
model such that these businesses must inevitably create severe competitive risks
in the absence of regulatory oversight? Before their regulation the largest
reservations systems, Sabre and A pollo, enjoyed enormous freedom in setting
their fees because they w ere able to charge airlines rather than travel agencies.
Google today likew ise enjoys enormous latitude in setting its prices for
keyw ords, in large measure because searchers never pay or even see those prices.
Because users search w ith Google, companies must participate in Google search
and they must pay enough to participate. Does this structure inherently harm
the competitive process? M ost importantly, does this new business model now
require an explicit extension to the Sherman (A ntitrust) A ct, much as A T& T’s
natural monopoly in telecommunications in the early part of the 20th century did?
The paper advances the follow ing legal arguments:
•

Google may enjoy monopoly pow er in search, w hich is the relevant market for
consideration, and not advertising.

•

Search may be a form of electronic distribution, like travel agent reservations
systems, and search may be an essential facility, one to w hich companies must
have access if their business requires that they can be found by consumers.

•

Search engines’ third party payer business model may free their keyw ord
auctions from the effective discipline of the market; that is, prices in the auction
may be limited by the value of the contact to the firm bidding for auction terms,
not by the value of search to the consumer if the consumer is not paying.
Ow ners of such essential facilities may enjoy monopoly pricing pow er in the
presence of parallel monopolies, rather than pure monopolies, because if some
consumers only use Google then it is essential to be present in Google, even if
Yahoo w ere available at a low er price.

•

A nd if the above are true, and if Google uses even a small portion of its
monopoly profits to provide incentives to consumers to remain w ith Google,
then this business model w ill remain stable even if prices charged to corporations
are extraordinarily high, further increasing consumers’ reliance upon Google.
A gain, if consumers are induced to stay, and consumers are not the ones paying
for search, there is no discipline imposed upon the price of search by the market.

•

Finally, if the above are true, and if Google uses a significant portion of its
monopoly profits to underw rite other ventures, it may be able to engage in
subsidized preemptive line extensions, increasing consumer choice initially but
restricting future competition.

The rest of the paper provides some context on search engine providers, and on Google
specifically, and then examines the legal arguments that w ould need to be used to
assess each of the points above.
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Essential D isclaimers
It is essential to note the follow ing disclaimers w hile reading this paper.
•

We are not describing w hy Google should face antitrust litigation

•

We are not describing w hy Google should lose antitrust litigation

•

We are not describing or seeking to quantify the precise economic damages that
may be caused by Google

•

We are describing w hat the central issues in any litigation may entail, w ithin the
context of current antitrust jurisprudence, if indeed such litigation occurs, to
highlight the areas w here regulatory change may be necessary.

M ost importantly, w e are describing specific areas in w hich current jurisprudence may
prove inadequate, leading to groundbreaking disputes over appropriate extensions.
Indeed, Google also believes that the issues raised here are those that they w ill face in
court, if indeed, this ever goes to court. Like any firm that is responsible to interests of
their investors, they are preemptively attempting to put the best possible spin on them,
through press releases (e.g., [50]) and meetings w ith major new spapers (e.g., Burns,
[13]). N ot surprisingly, they also have an extensive lobbying budget [55]. The analysis
presented here can help provide an understanding of w hy antitrust litigation w ill or
w ill not be brought against Google, and can help provide an understanding of the
arguments that w ill unfold and the decisions that w ill need to be made if such antitrust
proceedings commence.
M any of these issues are still in flux, like the explicit meanings of and limits to
applicability of bundling and tying or essential facilities doctrine, w ith the courts
continuing to redefine, clarify, and alter interpretations. Litigation is likely not only to
be shaped by decades of legal history on the issues mentioned in our review of specific
issues above, but also is likely to shape antitrust regulation and jurisprudence for next
several decades as w ell. For that reason the view s of those of us w ho study information
economics, business strategy, and modern competition may suddenly and at least
briefly now be as relevant as the view s of antitrust law yers in the shaping of A merica’s
antitrust policies.
When the issue of economics is addressed by litigators, it is usually in the context of
quantifying damages, w hich is usually based on some form of accounting, cost
accounting, or but-for analysis. (But-for analysis” is a means of assessing how the w orld
w ould have been, but-for a specific action, in order to assess w hether or not harm has
occurred and the extent of any resulting harm. In general, concrete econometrics or
simulation modeling is required, and fanciful analyses are generally not permitted, such
as for “ For want of a nail the shoe was lost, for want of a shoe the horse was lost, for want of a
horse the rider was lost … ,” w hich try to blame the blacksmith for the fall of a kingdom.)
Rather, the discussion of economics here is intended to highlight that economics drives
business strategy, w hich is constrained or channeled by law , to achieve broad social
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goals. A s technology changes economics, changing the range of profitable alternatives
available to business, the law may need to be changed as w ell. A t no point in this paper
do w e attempt either to determine the presence of harm or to provide estimates of
damages that might result should harm be determined to have been caused.
Structure of The Paper
The structure of this paper is as follow s:
•

We first explain our interest in Google as the most successful example of a third
party payer digital business, and presents a quick review of the company and its
business model.

•

We next explain the concept of relevant market share, essential to the DoJ’s case
against M icrosoft, and likely to be central to any DoJ action involving Google.

•

We examine electronic distribution in the context of the essential facilities
doctrine and asks if the regulation of essential facilities needs to be rethought or
extended in order to deal explicitly w ith electronic distribution channels.

•

We examine w hether there is any evidence that Google has monopoly pow er or
is exploiting monopoly pow er: (1) What are Google’s current business practices,
can it set its ow n prices for search terms, and does it bias search in a w ay that
damages consumers? (2) Does it have extraordinary market pow er? (3) Does its
ability to provide for cross-subsidies for other lines of business strengthen the
argument for monopoly pow er? (4) Do these cross subsidies help or harm
competition by increasing or decreasing consumer choice? (5) Do these cross
subsidies violate prohibitions bundling and tying or any other existing legal
doctrines?

•

We consider w hether or not there is sufficient possibility of consumer harm to
justify the Department of Justice’s considering bringing an antitrust case against
Google. We examine both current harm, due to consumer confusion, inferior
purchases, or higher prices, and future harm, due to harm to the competitive
process and reduction in future choice, reduction in future innovation, or higher
prices in the future. It concludes by considering if it appears that these cross
subsidies harm competition and that the monopoly pow er that created them w as
obtained legally, is it necessary to provide new regulatory guidance or w ill the
existing legal framew ork prove adequate to provide judicial relief?

•

Finally, w e present our conclusions regarding the five issues raised in the review
of specific issues above, examines limitations of this w ork and directions for
future research.

This paper does not explicitly consider the possibility of private antitrust law suits,
brought either by competitors or by customers. We had considered customer law suits
unlikely because of the oft-stated fear of retaliation by Google or by costs associated
w ith such litigation, until w e recently became aw are of Tradecomet.com v. Google [75].
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The requirements for a private suit w ould be different w ith respect to standing and to a
degree w ould be more difficult to satisfy,iii but the essential logic needed to support the
litigation w ould be similar to that w hich w e expect w ould be pursued by the
Department of Justice, and the problems interpreting current law and legal practice
likew ise w ould be similar.

An Overview of Google and its Business M odel
Google is certainly an Internet success story, w ith 60% or more of the US market for
Internet search; recent estimates range from a low of 67% to a high of 77% [22], [45],
[68], and do not appear to be dropping significantly since the launch of M icrosoft’s
Bing. The company does not break out profit margins by lines of business, but w ith an
operating margin in excess of 35% for the company as a w hole [93], and w ith virtually
all profits coming from search, profit margins from search are extraordinarily high.
Likew ise, profits from search have funded its expansion into a range of semi-related
and unrelated activities. Google is not only one of the most profitable companies on the
net, but it is one of the most admired companies in A merica, having done a marvelous
job of managing its public image. It has found a business model that allow s it to
provide a product to one set of customers (users performing search) w ithout charge,
w hile having another set of customers to pay very high prices (companies desiring to be
found) to subsidize the services offered to the searchers, adding to the firm’s popularity.
Google’s model is w orking: Simple financials provide one indication. With gross
profits of $13.17 billion on sales of $23.65 billion, w ith profit margins of 27.57% and
return on equity of 20.30%, and w ith a cash horde of $24.48 billion, Google truly is the
successful giant among search engines. The equivalent figures for Yahoo, Google’s
closest competitor in search, are gross profits of $4.19 billion on sales of $6.46 billion,
profit margins of 9.26% and a return on equity of 5.04%, and cash on hand of $3.29
billion [93].
Google has a w ide range of other business activities, not all related to search, w hich can
be view ed on its w ebsite (w w w .google.com/ options/ ).
•

Tw enty three of these are related to search beyond its traditional search engine,
including commercial (Checkout), scholarly (Scholar), image-focused (Images)
and map-based (M aps, Earth) and special purpose (finance, patent). Google now
offers its ow n brow ser under this category as w ell (Chrome).

•

A nother fourteen are aimed at communications and sharing. These are largely
free to their users.

•

Three more are aimed at mobile users.

Some evidence of Google’s popularity can be gathered from the Fortune lists of the
World’s 50 M ost A dmired Companies and the Fortune lists of the 100 Best Companies
to Work for in A merica and the Forbes list of M ost A dmired companies in A merica.
While not previously on the list of most admired companies, in 2009 Google earned
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fourth spot on Fortune’s list of most admired companies. Similarly, w hile not
previously on the list of best companies to w ork for, Google entered the list at number 1
in 2007, in part based on extraordinary benefits and, of course, in part based on
extraordinary non-salary compensation, and in 2008 and 2009 continued to enjoy the
fourth spot.
Google’s users are extraordinarily loyal and vocal [70]:
•

“ Government touches google = we revolt… this is sacred ground people!”

•

“ What if GOOGLE broke up the GOVERNM ENT, would be a more interesting story”

•

“ Don’t you dare touch Google? It’s personal.”

•

“ I don’t think that GOOGLE should be worried about the GOVERNM ENT … now vice
versa…”

•

“ They can take my Google when they pry the keyboard from my cold, dead hands.”

Clearly, by any measure, this is a popular company, and Google believes that this may
help deter or soften antitrust action.
Whether despite or because of its popularity, Google is now attracting unw anted attention from a range of sources. Some authors are beginning to question the stability of
a business based on attracting online ad revenues (e.g., [53]), and some even consider
the possibility that online community content may eventually replace much of Google’s
online advertising [24], [25], [27], [39]. M oreover, the general tone of press coverage
now regularly addresses the risks facing the company from antitrust litigation (e.g.,
[18], [21], [57], [65], [70]), and the anger of corporate participants in Google’s auctions
(e.g., [18], [64], [69]), and even concerns over Google’s appropriating the content of
others w ithout compensation [64].

Relevant M arket Share
The Concept of Relevant M arket
Relevant market share is assessed by first determining w hat the market for a product or
service product is, and then by determining w hat percentage of that market that
product or service has captured. This sounds unambiguous, but determining the set of
alternatives, direct competitor and substitute products, can be quite complex. One local
N ew York or Philadelphia national netw ork affiliate is probably clearly substitutable for
another as venues for advertising. H ow ever, the substitutability of The New York Times,
The Philadelphia Inquirer, and the Wall Street Journal, of Fortune M agazine, Time M agazine,
and The Economist, or of the H istory Channel, The Golf Channel, and The Food Channel
is less clear; indeed, these latter alternatives to a television netw ork affiliate probably
need to be arrayed in a tw o dimensional space, w ith one axis indicating the target
audience and another axis indicating the degree of substitutability.
The experience of M icrosoft indicates the importance of determination of the relevant
market and of relevant market share. M icrosoft represents only a small portion of the
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global economy. It is a larger portion of the technology sector, a larger portion still of
computing hardw are and softw are, and an even larger portion of the market for all
softw are. M ost importantly, it is a huge portion of the Intel operating system market.
During trial, M icrosoft tried to argue it w as about 3% of the softw are market; opposing
them, the DoJ and David Boies argued that it w as closer to 90% of the relevant market,
the market at the time for operating systems for Intel-based machines.
The concept of relevant market share w as so critical in M icrosoft antitrust litigation that
it is nearly certain to be relevant here as w ell in assessing how important Google search
is to firms’ access to their customersiv . A s Schmalensee notes [67], follow ing A reeda and
Turner [1] “ judgements [sic] about the presence or absence of market power often turn on the
definition of the ‘relevant market,’ especially in U.S. antitrust cases.” While Schmalensee
defines this in terms of collusion, more intuitive definitions are possible. A ttorney
David Boies, w hen arguing The Department of Justice’s position in M icrosoft antitrust
litigation, preferred to argue in terms of direct substitutes, consistent w ith earlier
Supreme Court decisions including Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.
w hich defined relevant market as the choice available to consumers ([40] at 481-82).
This view of relevant markets w as critical in the Government’s antitrust case against
M icrosoft in w hich M icrosoft’s market share in the relevant market w as found to exceed
95% ([78] at 74).
While M icrosoft argued that the relevant market w as the market for all softw are, the
DoJ argued that the relevant market w as the market for all operating systems softw are
for Intel platform computers. While M icrosoft’s share of the global softw are market
may be quite small, its share of personal computer softw are is larger, and its share of
operating systems sales for machines based on the Intel platform w as at the time nearly
100%. Indeed, based on these statistics, M icrosoft and its w itnesses w ere very reluctant
to see any definition of relevant markets accepted during the trial; in his first 65 pages
of testimony Professor Schmalensee refused to accept the utility or importance of the
concept in this trial, and argued that virtually any piece of softw are might ultimately
emerge as a viable competitor for M icrosoft’s OS [76] . We can expect similar resistance
from Google to the definition of online search as the relevant market for online search,
and a similar need for clarification of w hat constitutes advertising and w hat does not in
an era of digital acquisition of information before shopping.
The Lessons of Share of Relevant M arket from The M icrosoft Trial
Just as M icrosoft represents only a small portion of the global economy, Google is a
small portion of the global economy. It is, of course, a larger portion of the Internet
economy, and it is a huge portion of the market for Internet search. Google is now
trying to argue it is less than 3% of the advertising market [50]; how ever, if it w ere
show n that search is not a form of advertising, that advertising is not substitutable for
participation in search, and indeed that keyw ord auctions can trump or devalue
traditional advertising, then the relevant market w ill not be seen as all of advertising.
Consequently, if Google is subject to antitrust action, the DoJ w ill almost certainly have
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to argue that the relevant market is online search, and that Google possesses betw een
60% and 70% of this relevant market. Google accepts the importance of this distinction,
and w hile it acknow ledges that it currently captures 72% of the revenue for search
advertising, it represents only 30% of online advertising and less than 3% of all
advertising revenues. This information is taken w ith permission from Google’s
presentations at The Wharton School on 1 M arch 2010.
Sponsored search exemplifies the complexity of identifying relevant markets w hen
assessing new products and services, especially w hen these new offerings can be
framed in terms of more traditional predecessors. We are not suggesting that Google
calls its business a form of advertising to deceive either consumers or the courts.
Initially, its customers, companies that could be induced to bid for keyw ords,
understood advertising and had budgets for advertising; there could not have been a
better w ay to position the business for initial adoption by corporate bidders.
I s Search Just Advertising?
Google calls its profitable businesses Adwords and Adsense. Why aren’t these just forms
of advertising, and w hy isn’t relevant market just advertising in all its forms and
utilizing all available media?
But w e know w hat advertising is. A dvertising presents material to you w hile you are
doing something else, such as presenting an ad on the low er half of the printed w hile
you are reading the Times, making you navigate through a screen you encounter before
you enter Forbes’s online w ebsite, or interrupting w ith a TV a commercial you view
w hile w atching the Super Bow l. A dvertising creates a desire to buy now , or a sense of
trust in a brand that leads to buying later [24], [25]. The best advertising leaves you
w ith a clear and memorable image of the firm that sponsored it, like “We love to fly and it
shows (American Airlines),”or “Smart. Very Smart! (Holiday Inn Express)” or “Just do it!
(Nike)”.

These ads are much less useful if the customers search for a product after seeing the
companies’ ad, only to be redirected and to end up at a competitor’s w ebsite. We
believe that advertising is not a substitute for search, anymore than a personal
computer ow ner can substitute Photoshop or SA P in place of Vista or Window s. Search
is thus different from advertising [24], and not an alternative for advertising, but a
means of rendering advertising less important, perhaps even irrelevant [25]. Paid
search allow s a company to take temporary possession of a competitor’s brand, so that if a
user searches on M arriott M arquis or InterContinental London they can send the user to
a bidder for keyw ords like “ M arriott” , “ M arquis” , or “ InterContinental” , not
necessarily the ow ner of the brand. The distinction betw een search and advertising in
the definition of the relevant market may be crucial to any future antitrust litigation
against Google. If search is a form of electronic distribution, and if electronic
distribution can provide monopoly pow er even w ith market share below one third of
the market, then Google may be show n to have monopoly pow er, just as travel agent
CRSs w ere ruled by the Civil A viation Board to have monopoly pow er in 1984 and as
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confirmed by the courts in 1985 [62]. Specifically, the court stated, “ Though no airline
has a monopoly market share, that is not required by section 411” ([77] at 1114.)
The definition of Google’s product — w hether or not it is a form of advertising —
remains contested, and resolving this w ill again be crucial to the decision in any future
antitrust trial of search engine providers. This w ill continue to be debated, since
redirection, and even misdirection, as alternative forms of customer acquisition are
simply too pow erful for the courts to ignore. The history of acquisition through
misdirection certainly predates the age of electronic marketing [10]. N eedless to say,
the British courts did not view this example, w hich involved using false lighthouses as
signals to redirect ships onto reefs w here they could be plundered, as advertising, or as
any other legitimate form of business.
Google, of course, sees things differently, and argues that placing an ad for a sponsored
product above the product for w hich the consumer is searching is little different from
placing a store branded mouthw ash next to Listerine, in a bottle size, shape, and color
as much like Listerine’s as possible. In Rescuecom, Google argued that “ use of the
Rescuecom trademark is no different from that of a retail vendor w ho uses “ product
placement” to allow one vender to benefit from a competitors' name recognition [49].
A n example of product placement occurs w hen a store-brand generic product is placed
next to a trademarked product to induce a customer w ho specifically sought out the
trademarked product to consider the typically less expensive, generic brand as an
alternative.” Little in the history of advertising or of more traditional physical product
placement prepares the courts to address this issue.
D irection, M isdirection, and Redirection Explained
What does it mean to say the searcher “ gets sent somew here else” ? Definitions of
several terms may help (numbers in the text correspond to the numbered arrow s in
figure 1, w hich follow s):
•

Organic Search (1) — The results of a search returned because Google’s
algorithms suggest that these are the most relevant item for the user, based on
the terms in his or her search.

•

Sponsored Search (2) — The result of a search returned because a sponsor bid
enough for key w ords that appeared in the user’s search sequence. These terms
may be generic (e.g., London, hotel), obviously brand names (e.g., M arriott), or
more ambiguous (e.g., H oliday, Inn). The term may appear because the sponsor
w as the highest bidder, or, increasingly, because the sponsor bid enough, and
Google determined that this is the company that the user w ould have w anted to
see, even in the absence of bidding. It may not alw ays be obvious to the user
that these are sponsored search results.

•

M ap Ads (3) — These are the URLs that appear next to a map returned in
response to the user’s search.
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•

Ads (4) — These are terms that appear off to the right of the organic and
sponsored search results. M ost users are easily able to identify these as ads. Like
sponsored search, these results appear because companies purchased keyw ords,
and these keyw ords w ere used in a user’s search string, triggering the
appearance of the ad.

•

Scam Ads (Not shown) — This term is poorly defined, but the concept has some
industry participants very concerned [69]. Basically, a scam ad (or scads) appears
to be a URL sponsored by the trademark ow ner, but is actually the sponsored
URL for a different company, either a competitor, or a third party reseller that
sells many competing brands and may or may not actually represent the ow ner
of the trademark. These can appear among sponsored search results, map ads, or
ads.

Figure 1.—The results of a search for Marriott Marquis New York
A s a consequence of sponsored search, map ads, and outright deceptive scam ads, even
if the user is searching for a specific company or a specific product, using the relevant
brand name as a keyw ord, he or she may end up clicking on someone else’s URL unless
the firm that ow ns the brand has chosen pay and to participate in Google’s keyw ord
auction.
Both Google and its supporters argue that the presence of sponsored search and ads
greatly increases consumer choice by suggesting items consumers may not have know n
existed, thus making consumers aw are of numerous additional alternatives; increasing
consumer choice, it is argued, improves the consumer shopping experience. This
argument has some value, but it is both simplistic and, itself, misleading. M any firms
offer suggestion facilities. A mazon, for example, has a recommender system that is fair
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and honest, based on collaborative filtering, and requires no expensive bidding;
A mazon’s system also is clear and not misleading, and its suggestions are obviously
labeled as recommendations, not as alternatives that appear above the item that the
customer requested. It is clear by comparison w ith A mazon that this model w ould be
far less profitable for Google, but it w ould be far less expensive for corporations and for
consumers w ho ultimately pay the increased costs of Google search that are passed
through as higher consumer prices. Obviously, neither Google nor any other search
engine has any incentive to provide a free recommender service, but it is useful to note
that recommender services and paid search are not equivalent.

Electronic D istribution and Essential Facilities
I ntroduction to the Essential Facilities D octrine
The essential facilities doctrine provides that a monopolist or a near monopolist that
controls a facility that cannot be duplicated by competitors must provide access to the
facility if it is feasible to do so ([58] at 1132). “ Specifically, four elements must be
satisfied to establish liability under the essential facilities: (1) control of the essential
facility by the monopolist; (2) competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to
duplicate the essential facility; (3) unjustified denial of the use of the facility to a
competitor; and (4) feasibility of providing the facility [58]. The essential facilities
doctrine has evolved through legal history and jurisprudence and it is a matter of
common law rather than the result of specific legislation. For a more detailed treatment
see [37]. The Supreme Court has never recognized the essential facilities doctrine
although discussions of the doctrine in Supreme Court decisions seem to suggest that it
is still a viable part of antitrust jurisprudence. For example, in Verizon Communications,
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, the Supreme Court stated, “ [w ]e have never
recognized such a doctrine, and w e find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it
here” [89].
This w as also addressed in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline
Communications, Inc. [60]. We w ill return to this in our exploration of the uncertain
future of the essential facilities doctrine, below .
Overview of Electronic D istribution as An Essential Facility
If search is not a form of advertising, w hat is it? We believe that Google’s business
model is a form of electronic distribution, or a form of paying for customer access, and
w e believe that this form of electronic distribution and customer access is an essential
facility. Indeed, the argument w e w ill present in our review of prior experience w ith
electronic distribution suggest that this business model is largely analogous to that of
the travel agent reservations systems in the 1980s.
•

When United A irlines w anted to take over Denver as its new domestic
southw estern hub it redirected passengers aw ay from Frontier and tow ards its
ow n flights, using its travel agent reservations system, A pollo.

•

When A merican A irlines w anted to take over Dallas / Fort Worth as its new
domestic southw estern hub it redirected passengers aw ay from Braniff and
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tow ards its ow n flights, using its travel agent reservations system, Sabre.
•

Both Frontier and Braniff filed for bankruptcy, United captured its Denver hub
and A merican acquired Dallas Fort Worth. The pow er of these reservations
systems w as also then clear to other airlines, allow ing Sabre and A pollo
enormous freedom in pricing their CRS services.

Prior Experience with Electronic D istribution as an Essential Facility
Travel agents, Orbitz, and travel agent distribution systems like A madeus and Galileo
(formerly Sabre and A pollo) do not advertise airlines, they book flights. Similarly, it’s
difficult to argue that search engines strengthen any brand w hen they sell trademarks
like H oliday Inn or Dove. Rather, search engines direct customers, selling access, and
acting more like a distribution service. Brands are created and strengthened through
product innovation, quality of service, and advertising. Quite orthogonal to that,
brands may now acquire distribution and customers through distribution services
available to any bidder. A n ad in The New York Times may strengthen a brand, but even
this does not help the trademark holder much, if search directs a searcher to a
competing brand.
M onopoly pow er in electronic distribution channels is often difficult to assess since the
relationship betw een market share and market pow er may be deceptive, and even
counter-intuitive. Two historical examples that w ere subjects of much earlier research
provide the best w ay to begin the analysis, because their economic implications are now
very clear [23], [26], [29].
In the early 1980s A merican A irlines’ Sabre and United A irlines’ A pollo computerized
reservations systems (CRSs) already dominated the market for travel agency
reservations systems, w ith 43% and 27% market share respectively [36]. A t the time
80% of air travel bookings w ere made through travel agencies. Thus, w hile neither
Sabre nor A pollo accounted for a majority of any airline’s bookings, even the smaller of
the tw o controlled access to approximately 20% of every airline’s potential customers
and therefore approximately 20% of every airline’s sales.
The historical record makes it clear that the CRSs had market pow er at the time. When
A pollo dropped Frontier from its reservations systems, Frontier w as forced to file for
bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11; it reemerged, regained listings in A pollo, and
continues to fly. When Sabre, w hich w as larger than A pollo, dropped Braniff, Braniff
also filed for bankruptcy and no longer operates. Clearly, Sabre and A pollo enjoyed
considerable market pow er and clearly this pow er became evident to all airlines even if
it w as not immediately perceived by passengers or even by agencies. Ultimately, both
A merican and United w ere earning more from booking flights on other airlines than
from their ow n operations, and at one point A merican w as earning more from booking
passengers on Delta’s flights than Delta w as earning by operating them.
N either Sabre nor A pollo had a monopoly of the market for reservations services, but
together each had a parallel monopoly on the share of the market that they served
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through their agency customers. This should be clear from figure 2 below . M oreover,
this arrangement subsequently became stable in w ays that are not apparent from the
diagram. Both Sabre and A pollo paid travel agents to use their system, ensuring the
continuation of their market share, and ensuring the continuation of their ability to
charge competitors for participation in their systems. These w ere not bribes, but w ere
termed overrides in the industry.
A t approximately the same time Philadelphia N ational Bank (PN B), signed Provident as
a customer bank for its M A C netw ork, acquired Cash Stream, and consolidated the
position of M A C as the sole A TM service provider for the Philadelphia region.
Interestingly, even w ith 100% of the market for inter-bank A TM sw itching services,
PN B lacked monopoly pow er, w as unable to charge excessive fees to its member banks,
and never represented a competitive threat to the other banks in Philadelphia. This can
be seen from figure 3. The analysis for figures 2 and 3 is largely derived from our
earlier w ork [22]. These figures first appeared in the Financial Times in 2006 and w ere
reused in TechCrunch [26], [30].

Figure 2.—Geometry of Airlines, Travel Agents, and CRSs in the 1980s.

Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith N atural
M onopolies or Third Party Payment Business M odels

Draft 8.11 / / 29 June 2010
page 20

Figure 3.—Geometry of Banks, ATMs, and the MAC ATM driver in the 1980s.
From these pictures we see that the geometries of the tw o netw orks — CRS services and
A TM services — are quite different. The CRSs are positioned betw een the airlines and
their passengers. If one CRS drops an airline then all agencies that use the CRS and all
of that agency’s customers are denied access to one (and only one) airline. The agency
may not care, and the customers may not even know . M oreover, bypass of the CRS at
the time, before the presence of search engines and online booking, meant that the lost
business w as likely to be impossible to recapture as long as participation in the CRS w as
denied. Despite the high fees, no airline voluntarily removed itself from any CRS [36].
In contrast, each bank is positioned betw een its customers and the A TM netw ork
service provider M A C. If a bank is denied access to the netw ork, at least its ow n cards
w ill w ork on its ow n machines. M oreover, each bank used an identical interface in its
communications w ith M A C. Therefore the banks w ere able to forge an alliance — if
PN B attempted to compete unfairly against any one of them, they w ould simply
implement bilateral sw itching among themselves and cut M A C out entirely.
A gain, even w ith 100% market share, there w ere no complaints of abuse lodged against
M A C by member banks [29]. In contrast, there w ere significant complaints lodged
against the operators of the CRSs and, ultimately, rule changes from the Civil
A eronautics Board (whose responsibility w as later transferred to the Department of
Transportation after the CA B w as eliminated in 1984), severely limited the pow er of the
CRS operators. These rule changes w ere subsequently confirmed by the 7th Circuit
[77]. The reasoning of the decision explicitly acknow ledges the CRSs as essential
facilities [36].
A s show n in figure 4, the geometry of the diagram looks strikingly similar to that of the
airline reservations systems, w ith portals (A OL, etc.) in the position of travel agents,
search engines in the position of CRSs, and sellers in the position that corresponds to
airlines. The principal difference, w hich turns out to be largely irrelevant to our
argument, is that some users do go to Google.com or Yahoo.com to enter their search
rather than use their home page search box w hen searching. Still, most users have a
default search engine and most do not sw itch search engines.
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Figure 4.—Geometry of Airlines, Search Engines, and General Portals.
Perhaps the greatest mistake an airline could have made w hen dealing w ith A pollo and
Sabre w as thinking that they had a choice of w hether or not to participate; they had to
participate, and they had to pay w hatever prices Sabre and A pollo demanded. A nd
despite recommendations to consider your strategy carefully (see, for example, “ What’s
Your Google Strategy?” [47]) manufacturers, retailers, and service providers w ho need
to be found by their customers do not need and indeed cannot have a strategy for
dealing w ith Google in the sense described by the article’s authors; those that w ish to
survive w ill indeed continue to participate in Google and Yahoo’s keyw ord auctions.
Google’s market share for sponsored search and for search generally is larger than the
share Sabre or A pollo enjoyed. The conditions are right for Google to enjoy enormous
market pow er over service providers, w ho feel they must bid for positions in Google’s
sponsored search keyw ord auctions.
Offsetting the fact that Google’s market share advantage in search is greater than that
w hich Sabre and A pollo once enjoyed is the fact that alternative routes into hotel
reservations systems exist. Customers can call the hotel or the chain’s reservations
systems, or can use the hotel’s w ebsite, the chain’s w ebsite, or other third party
w ebsites.
The Uncertain Future of the Essential Facilities D octrine.
We are not sure that the essential facilities doctrine, as it is evolving, w ill even be seen
to be relevant by the time a trial might occur. The Supreme Court has never recognized
the essential facilities doctrine, although discussions of the doctrine in Supreme Court
decisions seem to suggest that it is still a viable part of antitrust jurisprudence, as
discussed above.
We do believe that some form of essential facilities doctrine w ill prove useful and valid.
Redirection and misdirection give search engine providers enormous pow er, as travel
agent reservations systems did before them. The decoupling of use by searchers from
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payment by companies that w ish to be found effectively removes this essential facility
from the discipline of market pricing, as it likew ise did for reservations systems
vendors. Both regulators and the courts felt that reservations systems required
regulation, and w e believe that some form of essential facilities doctrine w ill provide
the rationale for recoupling search engine vendors to the discipline of the markets.
A s it is currently understood, there are four elements that must be satisfied in order to
establish liability under the essential facilities doctrine:
1. M onopoly control of the essential facility, w ith w hat is currently understood as
monopoly market share for the industry in question.
2. Competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility.
3. Unjustified denial of the use of the facility to a competitor.
4. Feasibility of providing the facility.
(See e.g., [58] at 1132 .)
A lthough the essential facilities framew ork is applied in analyzing “ refusals to deal”
betw een competitors, the follow ing analysis show s how the current essential facilities
doctrine might be applied to Google and to illustrate the shortcomings of essential
facilities doctrine w ith respect to electronic distribution netw orks and paid search as the
doctrine is currently understood:
1. There is no doubt that Google controls its search engine and certainly “ guides”
advertisers and competitors of trademarked brands in selecting those keyw ords.
2. A s described above, w hat prevents companies that object to paying for Google
search is in part a function of the third party payer model, and in part a function
of the nature of search itself. N o user w ants a search engine from M arriott, and
another from H yatt, and another from Delta airlines, any more than a travel
agent w anted a CRS from each airline that had a grievance w ith Sabre or A pollo;
competition w ill only come from an alternative generic search engine w ith the
full capabilities of Google. A nd no user has a strong incentive to leave Google as
long as Google is “ cheaper than free,” any more than an agency had a reason to
leave Sabre and A pollo w hen they w ere receiving large payments in the form of
negative rents (again, called overrides in the industry) for using Sabre and
A pollo.
3. Since Google does not deny access to search to any firm that is w illing to pay the
demanded price for keyw ords it may appear that the essential facilities doctrine
does not apply. It is important to note that the same situation w as present in the
case of M CI Commc’n Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co. cited above [58]. A TT did
not deny M CI access to the w ire into its customers’ home, access to the local
loop, frequently also called “ access to the last mile” , it merely demanded
payment that M CI considered extortionist. The courts sided w ith M CI.
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4. In the case of M CI Commc’n Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co. the courts decided
that A T& T could provide local loop access at low er rates than it w as demanding
[58]. The question remains w hether Google w ould be required to provide its
search service and keyw ord auctions at low er prices to companies that
participate in its keyword auctions.
We examine this fourth point, the pricing of an essential facility and the possibility that
Google could offer low er prices, in the examination of the possibility of predatory pricing, immediately follow ing. M ost importantly, essential facilities arguments w ere historically offered only w hen contesting firms w here in the same industry. Both A T& T
and M CI w ere telecommunications companies, and A merican and Braniff w ere both
airlines. The use w e are proposing for essential facilities adheres to the four points
generally required, but remains novel since Google and the bidders for key w ords are
not competitors. The courts could indeed decide that Google has no obligation to provide search terms (that is, access to the facility of search) at low er prices. We explore
this, and the possible need for novel antitrust jurisprudence below , w hen w e ask “ Is
N ew Legal Doctrine Required to Permit A ction?” and “ Is A dditional Regulation A ctually N eeded?” . This has recently become more ambiguous, since the preliminary probe
launched by the European Commission “ into its dominant position in online brow sing
and digital advertising follow ing allegations that it demotes competing w ebsites” in
search results listings; in other w ords, that it denies competitors access to an essential
facility [21].
A gain, w e are aw are that w e are going beyond traditional and generally accepted use of
essential facilities doctrine. For instance, A reeda & Turner caution that the doctrine
should “ at most” extend to “ facilities that are a natural monopoly, facilities w hose
duplication is forbidden by law , and perhaps those that are publicly subsidized and
thus could not practicably be built privately” ([5], ¶ 736.2b at 680-81). While Google is
not a natural monopoly and its market share is less than the near-100% of local loop
access that A T& T controlled, it is significantly higher than the share that Sabre or
A pollo enjoyed. A nd again, w e w ill argue in below that the parallel monopoly
construct present in electronic distribution and the decoupling of search term prices
from the discipline of the market, may require extensions to regulatory structures, much
as the introduction of the now accepted concept of natural monopoly did w hen it w as
required to deal w ith the emergence of A T& T. Once again, the courts could indeed
decide that a parallel monopoly is no monopoly at all, that third party payer models are
irrelevant, and that if present search providers’ prices are too high any or all bidders
could abandon them.
Google should, and w ill, argue that paid search does not constitute an essential facility;
users can find anything they w ant through organic search, or by calling an organization
after finding it in the yellow pages. A irlines argued similarly that a traveler could make
a hotel or airline reservation by bypassing their travel agencies and calling the
company’s toll-free phone number, or in the case of hotels, by calling individual
properties directly. M ost did not. While the courts w ill be the final arbiters of any
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change in antitrust policy to accommodate search and third party payer models, w e feel
that information economists are ideally suited to surface the critical new economic
issues, and to provide guidance in this unfamiliar territory.

The Possibility of Predatory Pricing and The Possible
Anti-Competitive Uses of Any Resulting Profits
Google’s Current Business Practices
Google has argued that its business practices are legitimate for three reasons:
1. because the best seller is generally ranked highest among sponsored search
results
2. because by definition sellers do not have to pay “ too much” for the use of their
ow n brands as search terms, because if they did they w ould refuse to pay and
resort to other forms of advertising; their participation indicates that prices are
fair and competitive
3. because Google does not actually set prices for keyw ords, w hich are set by the
market in an open auction; obviously, prices set in an open auction are not set by
Google and thus again by definition cannot reflect monopoly pow er and the
ability to set prices
A s Greg Burns of the Chicago Tribune reported in his blog after a visit from a team of
Google spokespeople:
“ We don' t really think there are serious antitrust concerns,” said M atthew Bye,
competition counsel at Google. “ If you' re doing things that benefit your users, it' s
hard to find an antitrust problem.” To hear Bye tell it, those questions all have
legitimate answ ers. The idea that airlines and hotels pay too much because of
anti-competitive practices is a nonstarter, he said. “ We don' t really perceive any
issue.” In its keyw ord auctions, he said, ” We don' t really set prices.” [16], [17]
Google chief economist H al Varian likew ise argues that prices for brands are not set
through monopoly pricing but through auctions, so prices cannot be too high or firms
w ould not pay them. H e also argues that companies w ith strong brands usually aren't
paying very much for the use of their ow n brand names as keyw ords in their ads,
because their ads are highly relevant to consumers and Google gives them a high
quality score, allow ing them to w in even w ith low er bids. (The best source for this at
the time w e finished our paper w as a YouTube posting, in w hich Dr. Varian described
Google’s auctions of search terms.)
The third point in the list above, that Google does not set prices and therefore by
definition does not have monopoly pow er, seems inaccurate in a w ay that w ill prove
critical to the future not only of Google but also to the future of antitrust regulation of
third party payer mechanisms. If consumers w ere to spontaneously make the transition
to an alternative search engine that ranked search results in the order implied by
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Google’s internal measure of URL quality, consumers w ould be no w orse off and the
market price for search terms w ould be precisely zero. Setting the price of search terms,
or of any other essential facility, through competitive auction does not indicate the
absence of monopoly pricing pow er. A lthough all analogies are dangerously imprecise,
the sole vendor of life jackets on a sinking ocean liner may not strictly set prices
unilaterally if he auctions them off, but these prices most definitely do reflect monopoly
pow er. Likew ise, if there are numerous vendors, each w ith franchises that give them
sole rights to sell life jackets on different sinking ships, then their market pow er is not
diminished by the number of such vendors that exist throughout the A tlantic. A gain,
analogies are imprecise, but multiple vendors of essential facilities can enjoy parallel
monopolies and can be effectively divorced from the discipline of the market.
Google’s policies do demonstrate sound business and economic analysis. Google has
moved from “ rank by bid” , w hich places the highest bidder on top, to “ rank by
revenue,” w hich places the bidder most profitable for Google on top, usually the
highest quality bidder, provider that bidder pays “ enough” for the use of his ow n
trademark as a search term (see, for example, Varian [88] for an explanation of rank by
revenue). Indeed, rank-by-revenue has been universally adopted, not only by Google
but also by competitors such as Yahoo and Bing.
In brief, Google most frequently places the items that they know users truly w ant atop
the sponsored search list, ahead of the highest bidders, because this practice generates
more clicks and more revenue for Google. That doesn’t mean that the superior seller is
alw ays placed at the head of the sponsored search list; the superior seller does have to
bid w hat Google terms to be enough. This suggests (1) that in part Google does have
the pow er to set prices and (2) Google does know enough to provide an alternative
recommender system, if indeed it chose to do so in place of a sponsored search
business.
Google’s move to rank-by-revenue is beneficial for Google precisely because it is better
for consumers than rank-by-bid. Consumers are more likely to find w hat they w ant
than if Google still used rank-by-revenue, and are more likely to be satisfied w ith the
URLs on w hich they click. This generates adequate consumer satisfaction. A s
importantly, consistently providing consumers w ith high-bidding but poor quality
sponsored search results w ould signal to consumers that the top spot may be w eak and
that perhaps sponsored search should be ignored entirely. Since consumers deserting
sponsored search w ould destroy Google’s business model, it is not surprising that
Google has found a w ay to maximize its revenue, maximize consumer satisfaction, and
avoid discrediting its ow n business.
Google now returns search results largely in the order that you w ould get from free and
natural organic search, w hile still charging companies billions of dollars for the use of
search terms. It is hard to ignore the argument that receiving so much revenue, at such
extraordinary margins, w ith such limited value added, is not at least suggestive of
monopoly market power. This alone does not establish the presence of consumer harm,
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or indeed of any form of harm. Where stable business models combined w ith consumer
satisfaction and clever revenue maximization ends, and w here exploitive monopoly
pricing begins, is quite beyond the analytical abilities of the present authors, and indeed
is an issue that is likely to confront the courts repeatedly in litigation over digital
commerce models.
Possibility of H arm Enabled by Over-Charging in a N on-Contestable M arket
Relevant market share concentration alone does not demonstrate presence of or abuse
of monopoly pow er. The economist William Baumol and his colleagues have
developed the concept of contestability, w hich argues that even in the presence of
monopoly concentration, the concentration can sometimes be explained by the lack of
profitability, due perhaps to the lack of barriers to entry, to the presence of effective
substitutes, or to other factors [11], [12], [13]. M any A merican cities are currently
reduced to only a single new spaper, and w hile this is a source of considerable concern,
no one is arguing that new spapers are earning monopoly profits (see, e.g., [61], [91]).
Baumol’s test for the presence or absence of contestability is the firm’s ability to earn
enough in one market to subsidize others. This demonstrates the presence of market
pow er by demonstrating the presence of monopoly prices, evidenced by the ability to
generate subsidies, and demonstrates anticompetitive behavior by demonstrating the
v
use of these subsidies to deter entry by competitors.
It might be argued that since electronic businesses have no barriers to entry,
contestability cannot be applicable. We prefer to use contestability as Baumol
proposed; w e look at Google, w e see extraordinary margins sufficient to provide
massive subsidies in unrelated lines of business, and w e seek an explanation for the
absence of contestability these subsidies imply. Despite spending hundreds of millions
of dollars on development, and an additional $100 million on advertising, M icrosoft has
not yet been able to provide search that is fully comparable to Google’s. M icrosoft
readily admits that Bing is not yet fully able to match Google w ith respect to certain
categories of search [34]. In a recent blog post by Dave H einer, M icrosoft admitted that
it is having difficulty catching up to Google because of Google’s superior “long tail”
search, coupled w ith other netw ork effects.
A dditionally, w e learned in the M icrosoft trial that absence of contestability may lead to
consumer harm. If a company is earning so much in operating systems that it can
afford to subsidize w eb brow sers, then the company is both enjoying monopoly pow er
in operating systems and overcharging for them, and it is ultimately reducing consumer
vi
While subsidized preemptive line extensions may increase
choice in other areas.
consumer choice initially, they force other firms out of the market or deter entry, and
ultimately reduce future consumer options.
We believe the same arguments w ill need to be established in any antitrust litigation
involving Google, and there are several areas that w ill need to be explored, both in
understanding Google’s actions and indeed in assessing the actions of any company
w ith a similar digital business strategy:

Regulation of Digital Businesses w ith N atural
M onopolies or Third Party Payment Business M odels

Draft 8.11 / / 29 June 2010
page 27

•

Is Google over-charging consumers or harming consumers in other w ays?

•

A re corporations harmed by the market pow er provided by a third party payer
system, w hich frees Google from many marketplace restraints and does, as w e
have seen, allow Google considerable latitude in setting keyw ord auction prices?

•

Is Google earning enough from sponsored search to subsidize almost all of other
businesses, including gM ail, Google Office, Latitude, gDrive, and others? If so,
by Baumol’s contestability argument, it can therefore be presumed to enjoy
monopoly pricing pow er in its core search business. But is Google indeed
intentionally subsidizing these other businesses, deterring entry and, ultimately,
allow ing them to charge monopoly prices later, either for these offerings or for
search going forw ard? Is the competitive process likely to be harmed?

Consumer Confusion and the Purchase of I nferior Products and Services
Confusion matters. Consumers may be purchasing inferior goods from an inferior
supplier because the preferred or legitimate supplier w as not capable of matching
fraudulent bids. Simple comparison of costs w ill suffice to show that an illegitimate
attacker w ill often outbid the legitimate ow ner of a trademark. This is not solely a
hypothetical argument defended w ith simple computational models, but is also defensible on theoretical terms. M odeling show s, not surprisingly, that “ the intermediary's
profit-maximizing design choice, by attributing a positive w eight to the firms' bids,
tends to obfuscate search results and reduce overall consumer surplus compared to the
socially optimal design of fully transparent results ranked purely on product
performance.” In other w ords, the use of paid search reduces consumer w elfare [90].
A nd yet it is obvious from inspection that the firm in the top paid search location is not
alw ays inferior. A gain, by charging the trademark ow ner just enough and granting the
trademark ow ner top the spot in sponsored search, Google maximizes its ow n revenue
[39].
In its complaint against Google, A merican airlines argued both that Google w as
creating confusion and that this confusion allow ed Google to force A merican to bid,
supporting both the argument of confusion and the argument of channel pow er from
our discussion of essential facilities and distribution above [35].
“ In fact, because of the dominant role of Google' s search engine in consumers' Internet
usage and habits, Google effectively forces American Airlines to purchase the ' rights' to
have the official American Airlines advertisements appear when Internet users search the
web for the American Airlines M arks. In other words, Google has set up a system
wherein American Airlines and others, are, de facto, forced to pay Google to reduce the
likelihood that consumers will be confused by Google' s own practices.”
Consumer confusion w ill continue to be central to litigation against Google. Consumer
confusion w as the basis of A merican A irlines complaint against Google, w hich Google
settled [35]. Likew ise, the concept of consumer confusion and the prospect of consumer
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mistakes w ill be central to the retrial of Rescuecom’s litigation ([62] at 130). In the past
consumers appeared to have been more confused about the nature of sponsored search
than they are at present: Some consumers do not appear to notice that the top lines are
labeled “ sponsored links” , and some did not appear to understand that these are
different from organic search results. We conducted a small real-time polling of 150
students at the first session of their undergraduate Wharton courses, assessing their
beliefs about sponsored search. We found a much higher degree of understanding than
w e saw in previous years. For example, less than 5% believed that the top line w as
selected to be the best, w hile the others w ere roughly split betw een believing it w as
usually sponsored or usually most popular. We are not yet sure w hat the implications
of this change in aw areness might be or to w hat extent it is shared by the general
population outside the ranks of students in highly technical business school courses.
Consumer Confusion and Purchase through H igher Cost Channels
Consumers may be misdirected to inappropriate or higher cost channels for the goods
and services that they seek to buy. Consider the follow ing small hypothetical exercise,
assuming the follow ing hypothetical market conditions. A ssume that users search for
“ M arriott Hotels A rlington” , and that Google misdirects 1/ 3 of its searchers to an
aggregator w ebsite such as A rlingtonhotels.com. The aggregator then charges a 15%
premium on bookings of M arriot rooms. That is, 15% of the room rate goes not to the
individual M arriott hotel but to the aggregator as a fee for directing traffic to the hotel;
this is true even though the traffic actually began by searching for this specific M arriott
hotel. Because Google has 60% market share of the Internet search market, w e w ould
calculate that 60%*1/ 3 = 20% of all searches are being misdirected to the aggregator
rather than directly to M arriott. Furthermore, since 20% of consumers pay 15% less to
M arriott than they otherw ise w ould, M arriott’s losses due to Google are = 20% * 15%, or
3% of room revenues. A n expense like this, like a tax or other cost of doing business, is
passed on to consumers, so that, on average, consumer prices for hotel rooms are 3%
higher solely due to Google’s allow ing a third party to pay for affiliation w ith
“ M arriott” searches and allow ing the third party to show up in sponsored searches for
“ M arriott” .
The conditions of this hypothetical appear to be very sensitive to the time at w hich the
queries are generated. For w hatever reason, abusive search results that w e described in
M arch of 2009 had vanished by M ay of 2009, making estimates of consumer harm a
moving target and difficult to compute. But the w ebsite used in this example is not
hypothetical. A rlingtonhotels.com actually does exist, and is one of over 50 aggregator
w ebsites in the family otels.com.
Collectively, the tw o sections above suggest the possibility of harm due to abuse of
trademarks and the misdirection of consumers more generally. A lthough this is a
possibility, w e have not yet been able to measure it, provide a metric for it, or prove
significant harm.
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Corporate H arm, Present and Future:
The Possibility of H arm D ue to Excessive Prices
The lack of contestability and the presence of prices high enough to sustain cross
subsidies satisfies Baumol’s conditions for establishing that Google has been charging
monopoly prices. A re these higher prices alw ays passed through to consumers, and if
not, should w e care about Google’s charges? That is, are higher prices to corporations
grounds for antitrust actions? It’s clear that consumers do not buy steel or aluminum in
bulk commodity form, and yet antitrust litigation has been used to protect competition
(see e.g., [78]). A s noted previously, Google’s third party payer business model allow s it
enormous freedom in the pricing of keyw ords, and the issue of indirect consumer harm
due to excessive corporate costs w ill be an increasingly important consideration in the
regulation of digital businesses. Fortunately for the short term prospects of regulation
of digital businesses, antitrust litigation does not require the demonstration that
corporate competitors or corporate customers have already been harmed, that
consumers have already been harmed, or indeed that any current harm has occurred, if
the prospects for future harm appear sufficiently dangerous. Of course, how ever, the
type of harm that is required for antitrust prosecution is dependent on multiple factors,
vii
including (i) the plaintiff, (ii) the legal theory for prosecution and (iii) the relief sought.
Injuries in antitrust litigation do not require demonstrating that competitors have been
harmed; it is sufficient to demonstrate that competition has been harmed.viii M oreover,
in Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the court stated, “ A n act is deemed
anticompetitive under the Sherman A ct only w hen it harms both allocative efficiency and
raises the prices of goods above competitive levels or diminishes their quality” ([62] at
1434). Thus, if firms are spending more on defending their key w ords than w ould be
optimal and the quality of search is inferior or more expensive than it otherw ise w ould
be, it should be possible to demonstrate a violation of the Sherman A ct.
Corporate H arm, Present and Future:
Cross-Subsidies and D enial of Future Entry
Bundling and tying are the most obvious w ays of exploiting cross subsidies. Bundling
occurs w hen a monopoly seller either provides a second product w ith the purchase of
the first monopoly offering “ w ithout charge to consumers” w ithout charge; this is
considered dangerous because ultimately, having driven out competitors to the second
offering the monopolist can now charge monopoly prices for the second product as
w ell. Tying occurs w hen the monopolist producer of a product sells it w hile requiring
that the purchaser also pay for a second product, for w hich the monopolist can now
charge w hatever it w ants. The applicability of bundling and tying w ould be much
more clear and much more obvious if Google actually bundled YouTube or Google
Office w ith search and w ith GPS services; this w ould allow the same logic used to
attack M icrosoft’s bundling of Internet Explorer. There may already be some form of
bundling in the interaction among Google mail, search, and advertising. The
applicability of bundling and tying may indeed be more clear after examination of the
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bundling of features into Google’s new phone.
In A merican antitrust jurisprudence, the courts have found cross subsidies in certain
cases to be an antitrust violation. The most extreme form of this is tying, w here the
purchase of one product is made contingent upon the purchase of a second product.
H ow ever, these need not actually represent separate purchases, merely represent
transfer of earnings from one market to establish dominance in another. For example,
in the case of United States v. M icrosoft, the court found that M icrosoft’s bundling of its
operating system and Internet w eb brow ser constituted an illegal tying arrangement
([83] at 51-54); how ever, this ruling w as subsequently reversed on appeal (technically,
vacated and remanded for further proceedings). In the end, tying w as not proved,
further complicating analysis ([82] at 50). In yet another famous case, Image Technical
Services, Inc., the court found sufficient evidence of a tying arrangement betw een
Kodak’s services and its parts ([40] at 464). The issue of cross-subsidiaries often arises
in actions alleging monopoly leveraging, in w hich a firm utilizes its dominant market
ix
position as a lever to create, or to attempt to create, a monopoly in another market.
The courts may see Google’s subsidies for services like YouTube and text-based voice
mail or their most recent innovation of super-high speed ISP access as damaging to
other firms that compete in these markets, using subsidized preemptive line extensions to
deter market entry by other firms [44], [48]. The courts generally view deterring entry
as ultimately reducing consumer choice, and harming competition. A lthough readers
w ho are not familiar w ith legal argument may see this as the interjection of personal
bias from the authors, it is in fact a serious concern of the Department of Justice. One of
the problems w ith cross subsidies as that w hile they may increase consumer choice
initially, they tend to reduce consumer choice over the longer term by driving some
innovators out of the market. M icrosoft may have increased consumer choice w ith
Word, Excel, and IE, but w here are WordPerfect, 1-2-3, or N etscape today? The
antitrust concerns w ith cross subsidies are based on the belief that subsidies (1) reflect
monopoly pow er in the market that generates them and (2) generally reduce consumer
choice in the market that receives them.
In fact, a cursory review of Google’s products and services reveals over thirty products
that are provided free to consumers, and analysts see this as contributing to Google’s
popularity and profitability [18]. These innovations may be provided as gifts to
consumers and thus part of Google’s philosophy of “ don’t be evil” , or they may
represent subsidized preemptive line extensions, ensuring additional monopoly markets
later. These are not strictly tied purchases, but cross subsidies and the possibility of
x
reduced competition and future monopoly pricing w ill probably be investigated.
In Kodak v. Image Technical Services, Kodak took actions to prevent independent service
organizations from serving Kodak products ([40] at 481). Specifically, Kodak adopted a
policy of selling parts for its equipment only to customers that serviced their ow n
products or used Kodak for their repair services. A fter the Supreme Court defined the
relevant market and determined that Kodak did in fact have monopoly pow er, the
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court’s inquiry focused on w hether Kodak’s actions w ere taken to “ foreclose
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor” ([40] at 48283). A lternatively, if Kodak’s actions could be explained by “ valid business reasons,”
then Kodak could not be held liable ([40] at 483). Similarly, any analysis of
monopolization claims against Google w ill focus on this crucial distinction: w hether its
provision of free services is truly an embodiment of its motto, “ don’t be evil” or w hether
it is a means of entrenching its position as a distribution company by making its
products seem freer than free, as indeed the travel agent reservations systems also w ere
after override payments from Sabre and A pollo.

I s Anything in these N ew D igital Businesses
Really Subject to Litigation?
I s Google Really a M onopoly?
With some estimates of only approximately 60% of the market for online search in the
United States, Google w ould not appear to have a monopoly in search. H ow ever,
Google is actually quite close to the threshold for considering a company to have
monopoly market share, regardless of the establishment of harm, particularly if
Google’s estimation of its market share in search engine advertising of 72% is accepted.
The threshold is usually 70%, w ith numbers in the range of 40-70% being deemed
w orthy of attention. A s Google’s share continues to grow it may surpass the 70%
threshold. In HDC M edical, Inc. v. M inntech Corp., the court held that if a defendant that
has so large a market share as to constitute a predominant share, a rebuttable
presumption of monopolization applies ([49] at 1103). Likew ise, if Google search is no
more than another form of advertising, then companies can advertise in The New York
Times, in Fortune, on television, and of course w ith Yahoo and Bing.
The claim that Google is a monopoly, if some claim is made, w ill be based on some
combination of the follow ing assertions:
1. Google is not principally an advertising company, but principally is a
distribution company, w hich has chosen to represent itself as an advertising
company.
2. In electronic distribution, it is not necessary to be a monopoly to have monopoly
pow er.
3. Google’s pricing of electronic distribution, an essential facility, is anticompetitive.
4. Google’s actions, especially tying and bundling, demonstrate monopoly pricing
pow er.
What is a M onopoly?
Under section 2 of the Sherman A ct, the inquiry of w hether a defendant can be charged
w ith monopolization begins w ith the threshold question of the relevant market. A fter
the relevant market has been identified, it is necessary to assess w hether the defendant
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possesses “ monopoly pow er” w ithin the defined relevant market. "The offense of
monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman A ct has tw o elements: (1) the possession of
monopoly pow er in the relevant market and (2) the w illful acquisition or maintenance
of that pow er as distinguished from grow th or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident" ([80] at 570-71).
N ote that nothing in the definition of monopoly or of monopoly pow er requires that the
defendant be the only competitor in its industry, that it charge the highest possible
prices, or that it charges its ow n profit maximizing price. Indeed, monopoly pow er is
different from the offense of price fixing, and nothing in the definition of monopoly
pow er even requires that the firm w ith monopoly pow er explicitly set prices itself.
I s Action N ecessary or Justified?
H ow ever, the mere possession of monopoly pow er in a relevant market is not a
violation of Sherman A ct §2. “ The mere possession of monopoly pow er, and the
concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlaw ful; it is an important
element of the free market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least
for a short period—is w hat attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk
taking that produces innovation and economic grow th. To safeguard the incentive to
innovate, the possession of monopoly power w ill not be found unlaw ful unless it is
accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct” ([89] at 407). A dditionally,
recent Supreme Court decisions seem to suggest a narrow construction of violations
under section 2 of the Sherman A ct, noting “ as in Trinko, the defendant has no antitrust
duty to deal w ith its rivals at w holesale” ([60] at 1119).
The crux of any claim of monopolization (after defining the relevant market) w ill focus
on w hether a firm truly engaged in anticompetitive behavior. Thus, in short, a
monopolist w ill be found to violate §2 of the Sherman A ct if it engages in exclusionary
or predatory conduct w ithout a valid business justification ([55] at 157). In more
complex cases in w hich the allegedly monopolizing acts are not independently illegal,
the courts have engaged in a more thorough review of w hether the defendant has
acquired or enhanced its monopoly pow er through means that are competitively
xi
unreasonable.
I s N ew Legal D octrine Required to Permit Action?
The regulatory regime of the Sherman A ct w as soon extended w ith concepts of a
natural monopoly and of a regulated natural monopoly, as embodied in the Kingsbury
Commitment. These w ere needed in order to deal w ith the market pow er of A T& T, due
to the combination of (1) the clear benefits of interconnectivity, leading to massive
positive netw ork participation externalities, (2) the technical difficulties of
interconnectivity of separate competing netw orks w ith existing hardw are available at
the time, and (3) the enormous costs associated w ith the construction of redundant
netw orks. Consumer w elfare and technology interacted in a w ay that demanded that
A T& T be a monopoly, and that likew ise demanded regulation of that monopoly.
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Perhaps the tersest explanation of the Kingsbury Commitment’s role in the emergence
of A T& T as a regulated monopoly can still be found on A T& T’s w ebsite: “ For much of
its history, A T& T and its Bell System functioned as a legally sanctioned, regulated
monopoly. The fundamental principle, formulated by A T& T president Theodore Vail in
1907, w as that the telephone by the nature of its technology w ould operate most
efficiently as a monopoly providing universal service. Vail w rote in that year's A T& T
A nnual Report that government regulation, “ provided it is independent, intelligent,
considerate, thorough and just,” w as an appropriate and acceptable substitute for the
competitive marketplace. The United States government accepted this principle,
initially in a 1913 agreement know n as the Kingsbury Commitment.
It may be necessary once again to extend the regulatory regime of antitrust in order to
deal w ith the market pow er obtained by Google, if it is felt that Google’s pow er poses a
sufficient threat and that both competition and w elfare demand regulation. If Google
does have pow er, this pow er does not arise, as some have said, because search is a
natural monopoly [53], but rather because (1) search is an essential facility, needed both
by consumers and by firms that offer goods and services to them, and (2) search engine
companies’ third party payer model effectively decouples the pricing of key w ords and
of participation as the object of search from the regulation of the market, giving giant
search companies such as Google effective monopoly pow er even in the absence of a
formal monopoly, and (3) Google is demonstrably charging monopoly prices for
keyw ords, as evidenced inter alia by cross subsidies and the contestability test of
Baumol, and (4) as discussed above Google’s use of these cross subsidies may be seen as
subsidized preemptive line extensions, and they may at present or in the future harm
competition.

Conclusions and D irections for Further Work
Conclusions Regarding Five I ssues Studied
The first area w e addressed w as determining w hen you have a monopoly. The study of
Google, like the prior antitrust case against M icrosoft, underscores the importance of
defining the relevant market before assessing market share. A ny antitrust case against
Google w ill begin by addressing w hether paid search is a form of advertising or a form
of distribution. While w e believe that search is different from advertising, this w ill be
hotly contested in any antitrust litigation concerning Google, and is likely to be hotly
contested in future litigation, until case law effectively establishes w hen a new digital
business model represents a new product or service.
The second area w as determining w hen a firm has monopoly pow er and monopoly
ability to set prices. We believe w e have established that search is a form of distribution
and that distribution is an essential facility w ith enormous pow er, and that this pow er
comes even w ithout monopoly share as traditionally defined. Likew ise, w e believe that
w e have established that monopoly pricing pow er is distinct from actually setting
prices; that said, this may be seen as contingent on relevant market, and thus remains
subject to interpretation by the courts. Contestability theory and the ability to price in
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one market at levels high enough to subsidize numerous unrelated markets has been
seen in other instances as evidence of monopoly pricing pow er, and supports our
conclusions.
The third area w as how to determine w hether consumers, corporations, and the
competitive process has been harmed, focusing on Google. We have not established
either measures for this or the presence of harm, and it remains a direction for future
research, by academics, by companies that feel harmed, and by the courts.
We ask if monopoly abuses by digital businesses can be addressed by current
regulatory practices, and conclude that this may be quite difficult. For example, w e
cannot determine if Google obtained its pow er legally or not, and under current legal
doctrine intent to monopolize and monopoly pow er obtained illegally are essential for
prosecution. If Google is found to have monopoly pow er, and found to have caused
harm, and can be show n to have obtained pow er legally w ithout intent to monopolize,
then w e may have an instance in w hich current legal remedies are clearly inadequate.
Finally, w e asked if additional regulation might be needed, if for example search w ere
found to be an essential facility and if the essential facilities doctrine w ere found to hold
only w hen the ow ner of the facility and the harmed party w ere direct competitors in the
same industry. M ore generally, as explored next, third party payer business models
combined w ith electronic distribution may create a need for new regulation.
I s Additional Regulation Actually N eeded?
If there is harm it w ould appear that some action w ill be required to stop it, for three
reasons that w ere explored above:
1. Google’s pricing is decoupled from market discipline because the user and the
payer are not the same, and hence high prices charged do not alter user behavior
Thus, third party payer monopolies may be stable. A gain, in the specific instance
of Google, even if Google w ere found to be an expensive monopolist, no one is in
a position to offer search that consumers believe is cheaper. This is because it
search could not be cheaper for consumers: Consumers think it is already
cheaper than free, since it costs them nothing, and they are provided w ith a w ide
range free ancillary services.
2. A nd, if search is found to be an essential facility and if use of Google is the stable
search engine decision of most consumers, then this is the search engine w here
corporations have to appear. Bidders w ill continue to bid, and if there is harm,
then harm w ill continue to occur.
3. M oreover, since keyword auctions and sponsored search provide Google w ith
the revenue stream it currently enjoys, then the ability to misdirect consumers
and the ability to stifle competition in a range of markets that Google subsidizes
both w ill remain.
A gain, w e use Google merely as the most recent and currently most successful of a third
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party payer distribution system. A s explored above, it is not clear if or how litigation
w ill proceed in the case of Google, w hether harm has occurred, or w hether additional
legislative or regulatory guidance is required in this instance. M ore generally, w e do
feel that third party payer distribution systems are a fundamental departure from the
sorts of issues faced w hen the Sherman A ct w as drafted or litigated in the past, and
indeed that new digital business models w ill require new regulatory regimes.
D irections for Future Research
If additional regulation of Google is required it is not clear that current antitrust
jurisprudence is prepared to address the regulation of third party payer digital
businesses, any more than the Sherman A ct w as able to address natural monopolies.
This did not mean that the Sherman A ct needed to be scrapped, or even formally
amended. Rather, w hen society w anted the benefits of inter-operability that a
monopoly telecommunications provider offered in the early 1900s, and also w anted
protection from the potential abuses of a monopoly, a solution outside the remedies of
the Sherman A ct w as required. The result w as the Kingsbury Commitment, w hich led
to the first sanctioned, state-regulated, corporate monopoly. Society may w ant both
w inner take all businesses and the illusion of cost-free service that comes from third
party payer business models; it may also need to be protected from the potential abuses
of monopoly that this may create. There is a clear need for future research at the
intersection of business strategy, regulatory economics, information economics, and the
law .
We have addressed the possible need for regulation if harm has been demonstrated.
But is there really consumer harm or harm to competition? This needs to be more
carefully assessed. We believe that w e have show n the possibility of harm due to
consumer confusion, the possibility of harm due to stifling of competition, and the
possibility of abusive monopoly pricing of an essential facility. We have not yet
established that such harm exists, let alone provided a metric for it or a measure of it.
Future research is necessary to address both deficiencies in the current w ork.
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i

This distinction is particularly emphasized in the Second Ciruit’s recent decision in Rescuecom Corp. v Google,
Inc. in which the Courtstated, “[A] defendant must do more than use another's mark in commerce to violate the
Lanham Act. The gist of a Lanham Act violation is an unauthorized use, which “is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, ... or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of ... goods [or]
services” ([63] at 131, citing [1]; [41] at 1508-09). Legal cases in these endnotes are cited in accordance with the
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format adopted in the legal profession. The citation includes information about the reporter as well as the court and
the date.
With the recent Rescuecom decision it has recently suffered one of its first significant legal setbacks [52]. Rescuecom has sued Google for use of its trademark in sponsored search, and the appellate court has reversed the district
court decision and found for Rescuecom. Trademarks are protected from “use in commerce” by other than the
mark’s owner. The appellate court held that Google’s use of trademarks met the requisite standard for “use in
commerce” because: (1) Google is recommending and selling to its advertisers Rescuecom’s trademark; and (2)
Google encourages the purchase of Rescuecom’s mark through its Keyword Suggestion Tool. ([63] at 129). The
Rescuecom case is interesting and complex, and in some sense remains unresolved. Trademark protection forbids
the use of another firm’s trademark “in commerce” in a manner likely to cause confusion, or to deceive as to the
affiliation of goods services, although fair use does permit the use of another firm’s trademark in other contexts.
Google’s selling of a trademark to a competitor of the trademark owner is indeed commercial use, but it may not
constitute “commercial use” in the sense originally intended by the Lanham Act. (See e.g., [63]at 130-31).
ii

In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit articulated a general definition and test of monopolizing conduct: “To be condemned
as exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must have an ‘anticompetitive effect.’ That is, it must harm the competitive
process and thereby harm consumers. In contrast, harm to one or more competitors will not suffice... In considering
whether the monopolist’s conduct on balance harms competition and is therefore condemned as exclusionary for
purposes of §2, our focus is upon the effect of that conduct, not upon the intent behind it. Evidence of the intent
behind the conduct of a monopolist is relevant only to the extent it helps us understand the likely effect of the
monopolist’s conduct ([81] at 58-59).

iii

Specifically, courts limit cases in which plaintiffs have antitrust standing to cases that do not “avoid burdening the
courts with speculative or remote claims ([8] at 545; see also [74] at 1448 ("Antitrust standing is best understood in
a general sense as a search for the proper plaintiff to enforce the antitrust laws.")); [4]. Courts, as a threshold
concern, require that the plaintiff be able to show “antitrust injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent.” [9] at 334; [19] at 109-10; [15] at 489.
iv

The concept of relevant markets has been integral in analyzing monopoly power as direct proof of such power is
rarely available. Under this approach, courts infer monopoly power from a firm’s possession of a dominant share of
a relevant market that is protected by entry barriers ([81] at 51 (citing [62] at 1434)). The principal Supreme Court
case outlining the requirements for defining the relevant product defined the relevant market as that which includes
all products “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes ([79] at 395).
v

More stringent tests are possible. Based on the Supreme Court’s view of the “vice” of tying in Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States [85] as “the use of economic power in one market to restrict competition on the
merits in another,” courts have held that a firm may not utilize its dominant market position as a lever to create, or
attempt to create, a monopoly in another market. However, courts are divided as to what is sufficient
anticompetitive conduct in the leveraged market to constitute a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
vi

[83] (stating “[d]espite the fact that it did not charge for Internet Explorer, Microsoft could still defray the massive
costs it was undertaking to maximize usage share with the vast profits earned licensing Windows. Because Netscape
did not have that luxury, it could ill afford the dramatic drop in revenues from Navigator, much less to pay for the
inefficient modes of distribution to which Microsoft had consigned it. The financial constraints also deterred
Netscape from undertaking technical innovations that it might otherwise have implemented in Navigator.”)
vii

The Supreme Court has held that Congress did not intend to afford a remedy to everyone injured by an antitrust
violation simply on a showing of causation ([8] at 535). Specifically, the 9th Circuit summarized the factors in
establishing antitrust standing as follows: “(1) the nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury; that is, whether it was the
type the antitrust laws were intended to forestall; (2) the directness of the injury; (3) the speculative measure of the
harm; (4) the risk of duplicative recovery; and (5) the complexity in apportioning damages” ([51] at 987, citing [3]
at 1054-55).
viii

See, e.g., ([20] at 571). In Fisherman v. Estate of Wirtz, the court stated, “The antitrust laws are concerned with
the competitive process, and their application does not depend in each particular case upon the ultimate
demonstrable consumer effect. A healthy and unimpaired competitive process is presumed to be in the consumer
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interest” ([42] at 536). In United States v. Microsoft, the court similarly defined anticompetitive conduct as that
which harms the competitive process and thereby harms consumers ([81] at 58).
ix

In AD/SAT, Div. of Skylight, Inc. v. Associated Press, AD/SAT, who engaged in delivering electronically
transmitted advertisements to newspapers, accused the Associated Press of attempted monopolization,
monopolization, and monopoly leveraging among other claims ([2] at 220-21). However, the Associated Press
prevailed against claims of monopoly leveraging because AD/SAT failed to demonstrate that the service was
subsidized by AP’s other activities ([2] at 231-32).
x

This is not to suggest that below cost pricing is itself illegal. In order for this to be actionable, A merican
antitrust jurisprudence requires a likelihood that the below cost pricing w ill ultimate result in prices
above the competitive level and these prices w ould be sufficient to recoup the losses from below cost
pricing. (See [14], holding that a charge of predatory pricing under the Sherman A ct requires pricing
“ below an appropriate measure of [the defendant’s] costs and that the market forces are such that there is
a dangerous probability of recouping its investment in below -cost pricing.)

Although giving away products or services without charge is not illegal, it can be evidence of anticompetitive
behavior when it is coupled with “a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve” and “distinctly
anticompetitive bent.”x This is, of course, a very fact-intensive inquiry and one in which the distinctions between
competitive and anticompetitive behavior are not so clear. In fact, the Supreme Court struggled with this very
question in its most recent antitrust cases (See e.g., [40]; [88]; [60]).
xi

In more complex cases in which the allegedly monopolizing acts are not independently illegal, the courts have
engaged in a more thorough review of whether the defendant has acquired or enhanced its monopoly power through
means that are competitively unreasonable (See e.g., [7]) (employing a balancing test that asked whether the
challenged conduct had “impaired competition in an unnecessarily restrictive way” by attempting to “exclude rivals
on some basis other than efficiency” and whether the conduct’s “effect . . . on consumers, on [the defendant’s]
smaller rival, and on [the defendant] itself.”); [40] (asking “whether ‘valid business reasons’ … explain [the
defendant’s] actions”); ([88] at 399) (reviewing the defendant’s actions to see if it had engaged in anticompetitive
conduct manifesting “a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end” and “a distinctly
anticompetitive bent.”).

